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Abstract 
This paper outlines three versions of the intellectual: past, present and future. First, it 
describes an archetypal ‘Parisian’ myth; next, the dissolute present or ‘public 
intellectual’; finally, a future vision based on the new concept of ‘knowledge clubs’. 
The paper traces how ‘the intellectual’ has changed over time, and considers the 
consequences of hanging on to the past, especially by adding the word ‘public’ to 
‘intellectual’. While retaining the appearance of a character long dead, this phantasm 
may blind contemporary analysis as to the direction in which to look for ‘public 
thought’ in the future. It argues that the concept needs to be rethought according the 
approach of ‘cultural science’, where knowledge-agency belongs to culture-made 
groups not individuals.  
 
Intellectuals 1: Something in the coffee? 
 
Within the very limits of the teaching space as given, the need is to work 
at patiently tracing out a pure form, that of floating (the very form of the 
signifier); a floating which would not destroy anything but would be 
content simply to disorientate the Law. The necessities of promotion, 
professional obligations (which nothing then prevents from being 
scrupulously fulfilled), imperatives of knowledge, prestige of method, 
ideological criticism – everything is there, but floating. (Roland Barthes, 
1977a) 
 
Roland Barthes had a point when he wrote an essay on ‘Writers, Intellectuals, 
Teachers’ (1977a: 190-215), in which he contrasted speech and writing. The teacher, 
he argued, ‘is on the side of speech’, while the writer is ‘every operator of language 
on the side of writing’. Between the two is the intellectual, defined by Barthes in his 
‘neutral’ mode (Barthes 2005), as ‘the person who prints and publishes his speech’ 
(1977a: 190). Rather a bathetic definition, you may say, but it is part of a paradigm-
baffling project to deconstruct the binary oppositions that make discourse meaningful. 
Accordingly, Barthes is not content to accept such binaries, and in the ambiguous 
non-place between speech and writing he inserts the intellectual. He connects ‘the 
intellectual’ not with ideas but with speech, and speech with teaching. Barthes had a 
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lot to say about speech, including a structuralist concern for the extent to which 
‘language speaks us’, as they used to say, as well as poststructuralist pleasure in 
disrupting the doxa or ‘Law’ of language – a task he gave not in the first place to 
intellectuals, but principally to writing (of the ‘writerly’ kind that could produce 
jouissance). So here is a three-part distinction of terms that plays almost no part in 
current (21st-century) discussions of the topic: the typology of Writer, Teacher, 
Intellectual.  
 
These days, in discussions of the role of the intellectual, the ‘teacher’ is almost 
forgotten, perhaps in line with the reduction of status of teachers in many universities 
to an abject figure of the proletarianised precariat. But Barthes reckoned that ‘between 
the language of the teacher and that of the intellectual there is hardly any 
incompatibility (they often co-exist in a single individual)’. Over against the speaker-
teacher-intellectual he saw the writer as the one who ‘stands apart, separate’: ‘Writing 
begins at a point where speech becomes impossible’ (Barthes 1977a: 190). He was 
quick to gloss ‘impossible’ as ‘a word that can be understood in the sense it has when 
applied to a child’.  
 
But before we get to writing, it is instructive to consider more closely the context in 
which Barthes can claim that teacher and intellectual are coeval, with ‘hardly any 
incompatibility’. Despite the vigour of other national intelligentsias in the 60s, the 
‘preferred reading’ of ‘the intellectual’ was that of Parisian cosmopolitan café-society, 
and Barthes was one of its archetypes. In the 1970s, Anglophone cultural studies 
became highly Francophile: structuralism, semiotics, deconstruction, psychoanalysis 
and even Marxism were read with a French accent. Paris had the 1960s – ‘years of 
hope, days of rage’, as Todd Gitlin put it (1987) – written all over it. Here was a 
heady combination of Jean-Luc Godard’s À Bout de Souffle, ‘Continental’ philosophy, 
Les Événements of ’68, where you might bump into Althusser (or his shrink Lacan) in 
the café,
1
 or catch the bus over to the revolutionary Paris University VIII to see Judith 
Miller, Lacan’s daughter (until she was fired for handing out course credits to 
someone she met on a bus, as an anti-capitalist gesture), or else to see head-of-
department Michel Foucault, when he wasn’t busy joining in a student occupation and 
                                                        
1 As here, perhaps? – https://chaiselonguetheorists.wordpress.com/2013/12/04/exam-one-post-
marxism-2/. 
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throwing projectiles at the police. Or, you might attend one of Foucault’s weekly 
lectures at the Collège de France, which Barthes himself joined in 1977, having been 
nominated by Foucault (Barthes 2005) and where, just outside, he was run down by a 
laundry van (cleaned up by the binary-loving bourgeoisie?) while walking back from 
Sunday lunch with soon-to-be President François Mitterand in 1980. In the Parisian 
air, there’s the whiff of insurrection as well as Gitanes. In the coffee crema, there’s 
philosophy – literally, in the case of Godard’s 1967 film 2 ou 3 choses que je sais 




Coffee philosophy: Screen grabs of 2 ou 3 choses que je sais d’elle by J-L Godard 
 
In such a climate, the link that Barthes makes between teachers and intellectuals is 
much easier to ‘read’, as it were. Intellectuals were hot. Foucault’s Collège de France 
lectures were packed out, as much a part of pop culture as intellectual, not least 
because of the Collège’s rule that such events should be free and open to the public. 
This kind of teaching, you might say, was not outsourced, low-value drudgery, but 
part of the avant-garde entertainment complex, a ‘mass’ medium in its own right. 
You spoke, you published; you were teacher, intellectual … entertainer, celebrity … 
militant, hero … film-star, philosopher … it was all the same, as modelled by an 
amazing roll call of French teacher-intellectuals whose names still resonate (Lucy 
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2016). So when the Youth of The Day crowded into the lecture hall from the demo or 
the café, to critique the present, to capture the future, to make love and life, in pursuit 
of what Barthes calls ‘an art of living, the greatest of all the arts’ (1977a: 215), 
Barthes was talking directly to them.  
 
Despite the sectarianism that makes and mars progressive politics, and which had 
riven the intellectual Left after 1968 in France as elsewhere, Barthes could still claim 
in 1977 that ‘One of the things that can be expected from a regular meeting together 
of speakers is quite simply goodwill’ (1977a: 213). What optimism! What ambition! 
Goodwill among the many different parties, causes – and intellectuals – of ‘the’ Left 
was never secure. In this period, Left politics was gradually transforming from class-
based vanguardism and militancy, agitated by parties well to the left of parliamentary 
socialism, towards issues-led ‘new social movements’, aiming (for instance) at 
liberating subjectivities, opposing patriarchy, colonialism, racism etc., demonstrating 
for (anti-nuclear) peace, environmental and social causes, or seeking new forms of 
personal enlightenment through sex, drugs, rock’n’roll and Eastern mysticism. Each 
of these movements and issues threw up its own intellectuals, few of whom were 
based in universities or even political parties: some were gurus, some pop stars or film 
stars, others were writers. Leadership in new ideas was passing from politically 
constituted parties to the market: radicalisation was more likely to follow from 




At this time, in Germany (Red Army Faction), Italy (Red Brigades), Britain (IRA and 
others),
3
 and Spain (ETA), political militancy spilled over into terrorism. Some 
intellectuals sympathised, holding fast to the Bolshevik notion of party-and-class as 
the agent of change, without renouncing violence. Most controversial among these, 
perhaps, was the Italian philosopher Antonio Negri, who served a substantial term of 
imprisonment on charges of terrorism (later downgraded). Negri is still regarded with 
                                                        
2 John Maclean was a schoolteacher and Marxist hero of ‘Red Clydeside’. His fame lasted into the 
1970s via popular music: Dick Gaughan’s rendering of Hamish Henderson’s ‘Ballad of John Maclean’ 
(1972), celebrating MacLean’s release from prison in 1918 after anti-war agitation and refusing 
conscription: www.dickgaughan.co.uk/songs/texts/johnmacl.html.  
3 For instance, the Free Wales Army (active – and convicted – in 1969). See: 
www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/images-spark-interest-forgotten-free-2087129.  
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deep suspicion by some commentators.
4
 He retained a commitment to party-led class 
politics. But as Timothy Murphy, editor of his revolutionary writings (Negri 2005) 
has shown, Negri’s conceptualisation of what the party comprised changed with the 
times, from (i) a Leninist, command-and-control vanguard elite, centred on the 
proletariat (male factory workers); to (ii) a middle position where it was seen as what 
he called a ‘party of mass vanguards’, being the ‘totalization of mass initiatives and 
workers’ leadership’, i.e., the workers not the party called the shots in deciding what 
struggles to pursue; and finally to (iii) the party as ‘an external and subordinate 
tactical appendage of the class’, i.e. an action-squad with no control over proletarian 
‘self-valorization’ (Murphy 2005: x). In other words, to keep hold of an idea of the 
party at all, Negri has to concede, first, that the composition of the class of which it is 
the party must expand to include ‘students, women, the unemployed, prisoners, and 
other subordinated groups’, i.e. it has to co-opt the new social movements that it had 
played no role in engendering. Second, it slowly dawns on Negri that these folk can 
think and speak autonomously for themselves. As Murphy puts it, what links his 
writings over the period is ‘Negri’s gradual recognition of the self-sufficiency of the 
proletarian masses themselves: their ability to conceptualize, produce, and organize 
their own forms of struggle without the need for external command of any kind’ 
(2005: x). What need of a Party at all?  
 
In 1983, Negri fled to France from Italy, gaining sanctuary – and a new audience – at 
Paris University VIII and at Derrida’s Collège International de Philosophie. Was he 
still, but now in the guise of an international intellectual celebrity and teacher, the 
‘cattivo maestro’ – bad teacher/evil genius and corrupter of youth, as his prosecutors 
alleged (Murphy 2005: xvi)? He certainly sounded like it: ‘every act of destruction 
and sabotage redounds upon me as a sign of class fellowship … nor does the suffering 
of the adversary affect me’ (Negri 2005: 259).  
 
                                                        
4 See for instance the exchange between Negri and Alexander Stille in New York Review of Books: 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2003/feb/27/apocalypse-soon-an-exchange/, following a 
review by Stille in which he had written: ‘In his homeland, Negri is the most notorious of what the 
Italians call i cattivi maestri, the bad professors who poisoned the minds of a generation, sending tens 
of thousands of young people to the barricades to destroy themselves for a Communist revolution that 
could never happen’: www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2002/nov/07/apocalypse-soon/. 
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Is this the point ‘where speech becomes impossible’, in Barthes’s sense? Is Negri, 
with his fantasy of ‘fellowship’ in ‘destruction and sabotage’ (rather than Barthes’s 
‘goodwill’ among speakers), one of those teachers who encourages the class to be as 
unruly as possible, or is he himself merely the naughty child of speech and teaching? 
Where does the ‘speech-teaching-intellectual’ combination go from here? For 
Barthes’s distinction between speech and writing, the answer is clear: the intellectual 
must go across to the ‘separate’ domain of writing. That is exactly what happened to 
Negri. As Verso’s blurb for Books for Burning puts it, his texts of the 1970s ‘were 
later misread and misrepresented by the Italian state in its attempt to frame Negri as 
responsible for the assassination of former Italian president Aldo Moro, as the leader 
of the Red Brigades, and as the mastermind of an armed insurrection against the 
state’.
5
 His defence against these charges of terrorism was, of course, to argue that his 
writings belonged to an autonomous domain of ideas and were not an incitement to 
literal violence. 
 
The professional intellectual retreated from both class and classroom action, to take 
refuge in textuality and metaphor (not violence but ‘violence’). But the cat was out of 
the bag. As Gramsci (1971) had known, everyone is an intellectual because everyone 
can think. Now, with ‘the personal as political’ and activism dispersed across the 
social domain, up to and including the global markets in entertainment (especially 
music), there was no place left for professional revolutionaries (or philosophers) any 
more than for ‘traditional’ or ‘universal’ intellectuals (Foucault 1977).  
 
Now, ‘the’ intellectual was dispersed among myriad causes with no central 
leadership, ‘organic’ in a way that even Gramsci (1971: 9) may not have wanted to 
concede, because the principle of organisation, a party function, was deleted. The 
command and control of ideas passed from professional elites to the market (which of 
course had always dealt in them, out of the sight of intellectuals perhaps), and 
henceforth were self-organising, which also meant that they were subject to trends, 
crazes, marketing, branding, investment, the vagaries of consumer taste and 
manipulation by vested interests. But still, ideas could spring from anywhere, and 
gain adherents from anyone. ‘The intellectual’ could not operate without mediation, 
                                                        
5 See: www.versobooks.com/books/24-books-for-burning.  
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and the ‘mass media’ were by now an ascendant force in society, with their own rules 
and routines. The system of mass media (public and commercial entertainment and 
information across print, broadcast, cinema, music media) was the only one capable 
of coordinating such complex interactions, and so the claim that intellectuals could 
hold themselves apart as outsiders or exiles (except in Barthes’ sense, as writers) was 
more than ever untenable. The intellectual function was marketised, mediatised and 
democratised.  
 
It follows that intellectual and pop culture could no longer be separated, in practice or 
theory. Again, this was not new, for even in the days of Vietnam and revulsion 
against imperial ‘Amerika’ (as its own Yippies called it), the canniest European 
intellectuals and artists – Godard, say, or Nabokov, or Eco – were fascinated by 
American popular culture, the movies, the music, the cars, even as they used the sign 
of America to signal the end of everything their own cultures had held dear. Godard’s 
2 ou 3 choses had set the theme in train, back in 1967 (Ford 2013). Among plenty of 
other examples, a memorable emblem of this mode of (non-binary) thinking is 
Jacques Tati’s canny film Trafic (1971), where America is the source of both soaring 
hope and crushing reality.
6
 It sends up car culture while frankly acknowledging the 
Americanness (and TV-mediation) of the next quantum leap in human mobility that is 
already upon it, in the shape of the 1969 moon landings. Bumbling Monsieur Hulot 
(for it is he, in his camper van) meets ‘giant leap’ Neil Armstrong or, at least, coexists 
with him. One monopolises every TV set in the car-clogged city, while the other is 
stuck in traffic, destined neither to reach his destination nor to lose his faith in 
gadgetry.  
 
                                                        
6 Note that the title of Trafic is an Americanism, for the French for ‘traffic’ is ‘circulation’. 
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So let us leave that apparition, the Parisian intellectual, lost in suburban space, in the 
company of the harbinger of another kind of modernity, M. Hulot. What to do, but to 
join the global audience, sit back in wonder, and watch? 
 
Intellectuals 2: ‘A fellow of doubtful nature’?  
 
I define the Neutral as that which outplays the paradigm, or rather I call 
Neutral everything that baffles the paradigm. For I am not trying to define 
a word; I am trying to name a thing. The paradigm, what is that? It’s the 
opposition of two virtual terms from which, in speaking, I actualize one to 
produce meaning. (Roland Barthes 2005: 12-13) 
 
The charisma of Paris in the 1960s and 70s remains strong – as does that of America 
too, when it comes to that. But as I’ve argued, this was just the moment when ‘the’ 
intellectual had dissolved into popular culture, the market, and the media; and when 
political leadership was devolving away from parties and towards autonomous groups 
and networks. Among those most sceptical about the function of the intellectual as 
outsider, or bande à part (as Godard might have put it), were these very intellectuals, 
Barthes (and Foucault) prominent among them. In his inaugural lecture at the Collège 
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de France, Roland Barthes dubbed himself ‘a fellow of doubtful nature’. He felt his 
every ‘attribute’ was ‘challenged by its opposite’. But of course this doubtfulness was 
strategic as well as autobiographical. Chief among the opposites Barthes wanted to 
challenge was the one he discerned between the freedom of speech (and of teaching at 
the Collège) and the power of structure, which he attributed ultimately to language 
itself: 
 
We discover then that power is present in the most delicate mechanisms of 
social exchange: not only in the State, in classes, in groups, but even in 
fashion, public opinion, entertainment, sports, news, family and private 
relations, and even in the liberating impulses which attempt to counteract 
it. I call the discourse of power any discourse which engenders blame, 
hence guilt, in its recipient. Some expect of us as intellectuals that we take 
action on every occasion against Power, but our true battle is elsewhere, it 
is it is against powers in the plural, and this is no easy combat (Barthes 
1977b). 
 
Already we have entered the present: a world characterised by the issue-editors of this 
journal in their call for papers about the ‘public intellectual’. For Barthes, media, 
networks and celebrity are already hard at work, often in the name of those ‘liberating 
impulses’. But the duty of ‘us as intellectuals’ is not, as the phrase now has it, to 
‘speak truth to power’. Barthes knows there’s no doing that, for speech is co-present 
with power, and he chooses to do battle with language itself: ‘To speak, and, with 
even greater reason, to utter a discourse is not, as is too often repeated, to 
communicate; it is to subjugate’ (Barthes 1977b). Nevertheless, Barthes presses on 
with his investigations, albeit in the pre-scientific form of essays – that ‘ambiguous 
genre in which analysis vies with writing’ – knowing that intellectuals are not exempt 
from the powers they contest. He sees the ‘true battle’ for intellectuals here, in 
combatting powers that they themselves cannot avoid. This is the moment of the 








How is that combat faring today? Coming up to date, it is instructive to note the 
language changing as we speak. The talk is not of ‘the’ intellectual, but of the ‘public’ 
intellectual. Barthes’s original tripartite distinction between speaker/teacher, 
intellectual and writer has transformed into one between academic, mediator, and 




Barthes designated writing as a separate domain. For him it was perhaps the only 
place (in discourse) where, recognising that power cannot be evaded, he could 
nevertheless evade it: ‘the only remaining alternative is, if I may say so, to cheat with 
speech, to cheat speech’ (Barthes 1977b); to cheat it with writing, which Barthes is 
bold enough to call both a ‘grand imposture’ and ‘literature’:  
 
This salutary trickery, this evasion, this grand imposture which allows us 
to understand speech outside the bounds of power, in the splendour of a 
permanent revolution of language, I for one call literature. (Barthes 
1977b) 
 
Barthes turns the writer into a latter-day Trickster (Hartley 2010). This cheating 
imposter is the one who can survive within writing, which itself, as literature, keeps 
language unfixed: here’s how you can ‘disorientate the Law’ (Barthes 1977a). This is 
                                                        
7 Source: ‘Situationist’ by Espencat – Own work. Licensed under Public Domain via Wikimedia 
Commons: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Situationist.jpg#/media/File:Situationist.jpg. 
8 See: www.theguardian.com/science/2015/jun/09/is-richard-dawkins-destroying-his-reputation.  
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the ‘literary’ intellectual, as opposed to the ‘public’ one who opposes power by using 
‘a discourse which engenders blame, hence guilt’ to achieve celebrity.  
 
Perhaps the problem lies in the word public. It changes the intellectual into something 
else: a fame-seeking, media-savvy academic. As a modifier of other terms, ‘public’ 
can signify public functions where private ones might also be expected: for example, 
access to a place (public house, public bar, public toilets); or it can signify a public 
office (public hangman). A pair of Google Ngrams shows the frequency of various 
versions of the modifier ‘public’. The first runs from the 1980s to 2007, in books in 
English. Most frequent in this sample is ‘public house’, followed by ‘public speech’, 
with ‘public intellectual’ rising from nothing (about 1990) to third place, overtaking 
‘public toilet’ and ‘public bar’ along the way. This shows that the ‘public intellectual’ 
is a recent coinage, trending upwards but still playing second fiddle to the pub, at least 
in published discourse. The second Ngram, at greater scale and over a much longer 
timeframe, runs from 1800 to 2000, shows how ‘public domain’ overtakes ‘public 
house’ in the nineteenth century, while the much more recent ‘public sphere’ (which 
has replaced the older and more neutral ‘public affairs’ – not shown here), far 
outstrips ‘public intellectual’.  
 
 





Ngram 2 showing the terms public sphere, public domain, public house, public intellectual, in books in English 1800-2000 
 
How might one explain the recent growth of the term ‘public intellectual’ and ‘public 
sphere’? Their appearance in the wake of Reagan-Thatcherism is doubtless 
significant, at a time when deregulation, privatisation and neoliberalism were 
ascendant in the Western political sphere, both in policy and in rhetorical politics, 
provoking an opposing reaction among the defenders of public culture and 
institutions, from public housing, education and welfare to public service 
broadcasting and public culture. Since then, the term ‘public’ has become adversarial, 
a marker of left/right allegiances. Because this is politics, ‘our’ side of the opposition 
is treated as universal and self-evident, while ‘theirs’ is duplicitous and dangerous: in 
short, the knowledge involved is tribal – or ‘demic’, belonging to culture-made 
groups (Hartley & Potts 2014).  
 
At once, the ‘public’ intellectual is caught up in opposition of exactly the kind that 
Barthes refused. If you’re ‘public’ then you’re an opponent of ‘private’ – the private 
sector, private enterprise, privatisation. Binary opposition speaks through the ‘public’ 
intellectual, whatever they may say. So much so that a ‘public good’ (a neutral term 
from economics for ‘non-rivalrous’ and ‘non-excludable’ goods) becomes the public 
good (a moral economy). A structurally oppositional stance is presented as 





La lutte continue (The Struggle Continues), May1968. Atelier Ecole des Beaux-arts: (anonymous 
poster). Source: http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b9018349b.9  
 
The ideological adversaries of ‘big government’ (i.e. opponents of the public sector), 
including pro-corporate interests in newspapers and media groups as well as 
ideologues in political parties of the right, encourage and foment public scepticism 
about the claims of partisan intellectuals, with the results that all can see: public-
sector scientific, intellectual and cultural groups and individuals are politicised 
whether they like it or not, and there’s a chasm between what is known (science) and 
what is enacted (policy). If this is a ‘knowledge-driven economy’ it’s a pretty partial 
kind of knowledge, and its bearers are defeated by the very value that they espouse.  
 
If the ‘public intellectual’ is partial, then where is its opposite: the ‘private 
intellectual’? Private enterprise and its apologists simply do not use this discursive 
register or lexicon. Their terms are ‘public opinion’, ‘public relations’ and marketing, 
i.e. an important sector of the market economy devoted to the communication of 
                                                        
9 The citation attached to this poster in the collection of the Musée Carnavalet – Histoire de Paris 
makes clear the direct line of filiation from revolutionary, political design to subsequent market 
leadership in the art of publicity: These posters showed a ‘graphic inventiveness … which, 
paradoxically, then permanently influenced the world of advertising [la publicité]’. 
www.carnavalet.paris.fr/fr/collections/la-lutte-continue.   
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ideas. Here a ‘private’ intellectual might range from ideological warriors – Bjørn 
Lomborg being a current example – to advertising gurus. ‘Brand ambassadors’ 
include the many celebrities who make their name in one sphere (the performing arts) 
and then rent their fame for product promotion or partisan endorsements, some of 
them for public institutions or causes. While such figures are familiar enough, they 
are not often thought of as ‘intellectuals’, private or otherwise, despite what we know 
about their importance in the circulation of new ideas. Whether such figures are 
thought of as cattivi maestri, evil geniuses and corruptors of youth (e.g. Silvio 
Berlusconi and other politically active media moguls), or as figures of hope and 
identification with good causes (e.g. Dame Angelina Jolie, DCMG),
10
 they don’t call 
themselves intellectuals – and neither do academics, who are more likely to denounce 
them than to welcome them as fellows. This may be a strategic mistake if you’re 
trying to understand the function of intellectuals in society.  
 
But in fact there’s not much discussion about what a ‘private intellectual’ might be, 
even among those who are interested in ‘public’ ones. Sometimes the term is applied 
to the scholar whose knowledge is produced for a specialist peer group only, 
circulated in publications that the public never see, and who plays no part in public 
affairs or public life. That figure, once again, is the negative polar opposite of the 
public intellectual. Such a view motivates one of the most important developments in 
scholarly communication of recent times, the drive towards Open Access, where 
knowledge is made public using the capabilities of digital archives and internet 
connectivity. The argument goes that most research is produced by scholars employed 
in public institutions using public funds, but published in privately owned journals 
that these institutions then buy back at great cost to the taxpayer. Surely such 
knowledge ought to be a ‘public good’ too? Here, we do begin to see a shift from the 
intellectual as moral warrior to a system-based interest in the public state of 
knowledge. Unfortunately, the idea that all scholars are – or should become – public 
intellectuals is not practical in the current adversarial climate. To be able to imagine 
such an extension of the intellectual function we need to rethink the whole set-up. 
 
Intellectuals 3: Clubs and commons? 
                                                        
10 See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Order_of_St_Michael_and_St_George. 
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For though my career has been academic, I am without the usual 
qualifications for entrance into that career. And though it is true that I 
long wished to inscribe my work within the field of science – literary, 
lexicological, and sociological – I must admit that I have produced only 
essays, an ambiguous genre in which analysis vies with writing. (Roland 
Barthes, 1977b) 
 
Roland Barthes was on to something when he sought to ‘baffle the paradigm’, 
where meaning is made by opposing ‘two virtual terms from which, in speaking, 
I actualize one to produce meaning’ (2005: 12). This is the problem with 
‘public’ – it cannot be uttered without ‘meaning’ opposition. It doesn’t specify 
what an intellectual is or does, but recruits intellectuals to a cause of faith (troth) 
rather than that of making knowledge (truth). However, while refusing to be 
conscripted into the action brigade of those who are ‘against Power’, Barthes 
was still making a distinction between two kinds of intellectual, the fighting one 
and the literary one. Despite his own doughty struggles against bourgeois 
thought, going back to the 1950s, he clearly preferred, and indeed was, the latter, 
even though he ‘desires the Neutral’ (2005: 12). 
 
But that doesn’t help us to find what ‘outplays’ (the word he uses is ‘déjoue’: 
outsmarts, thwarts, foils, outwits) the oppositional paradigm. Perhaps the 
problem lies in the word intellectual. Whether public or private, literary or 
militant, Paris or publicity, the problem is that it refers to a person, an individual, 
and therefore to a character, subject, identity, persona etc., which doesn’t 
necessarily help us to analyse the production and distribution of critical and 
literate thinking in the digital age, for which we may need to get away from 
‘intellectuals’ altogether, so long as they persist as ghosts in the machine, posing 
as humans. Only then can we move towards what Barthes wanted for his 
analytical work: to ‘inscribe’ it ‘within the field of science’ (1977b).  
 
Clues, directing us to the path we should have been taking to get there, can be 
retrieved from the preceding sections of this (pre-scientific) essay. First, we need 
to abandon humanist individualism. Second, we need to abandon the 
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public/private (or any other) opposition. And third, we need to get out of Paris. 
Instead of using ‘intellectuals’ at all, my own preferred term is ‘public thought’ 
(Hartley 2012: chapter 4).
11
 The reason is that thought is produced, exchanged 
and diffused in systems, where the concept of speaker, writer, teacher, 
intellectual, even ‘person’ as the cause, originator or author of ideas is barely 
relevant. As soon as we turn to the global internet and digital media, we find that 
public thought has escaped confinement to the human individual. Furthermore, 
the internet is not structured in oppositions, nor does it respect previous 
hierarchies of prestige or authority. Public thought can come from anywhere, 
originated by anyone. Some ideas come from celebrities at the head of the 
Andersonian long tail, but myriad more are made at the tail, any of which (and 
according to the mathematics of probability, not the politics of opposition and 
exclusion) can trade places with the head and become celebrated.  
 
So far, so good. We’ve left the public/private opposition behind, for the internet 
is made of private (proprietary) platforms in which expression of thought is 
public (albeit constrained by and generative of new political differences based 
on digital divides, IP rights, privacy/surveillance and the like). We’ve left Paris 
behind (although, because it is ‘liked’ by so many, its traces are all over the 
internet, which is always just a few clicks away from nostalgia). We’ve left the 
‘metaphysics of presence’ behind too, for agency here is systemic and 
distributed, such that ‘thought’ is no longer a function of persons but a human-
machine hybrid, readily detached from one ‘owner’ or context and transferred to 
myriad others, where its productivity may be greater but unpredicted by the 
originator. And we’ve put in place instead a model of a large array of complex 
systems, in which scale and dynamism, regularities and turbulence, clash and 
conflict as well as collaboration and cooperation, demand a mode of analysis 
unlike that of literate critique by individual intellectuals, and more akin to the 
science of meteorology, i.e. probability, where forecasts rather than linear 
predictions are possible, using immense numbers of data-points and constantly 
modified computational models.  
                                                        
11 I borrow the term ‘public thought’ from Clay Shirky, in his answer to The Edge’s annual question for 
2010: ‘How is the internet changing the way you think?’ Shirky discussed what he calls ‘the shock of 
inclusion’. See:  https://edge.org/response-detail/11609.  
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But we’re not there yet, for the internet is not a uniform space. In other words, it’s not 
an open ‘public sphere’, where public thought can be universally created and 
accessed; or where new ideas enlighten the system from one end to the other without 
let or hindrance. This means, while we’re on the subject, that calls for Open Access of 
knowledge, welcome as they are, only go so far, because this model is still operating 
the private/public binary. Its proponents want scholarly knowledge to come out from 
behind publishers’ IP, DRM, paywalls and other mechanisms for creating artificial 
scarcity, that is, to be converted from private goods to public goods, available to all. 
But market forces still apply, and ‘private’ intellectual work does not enter a smooth 
‘public’ universe but one that is already lumpy.
12
 Incumbent players seek to maintain 
their position by capturing public thought as it shifts from analogue to digital mode. 
Clumps include former news-media mastheads (Guardian for thought; Daily Mail for 
celebrities); born-digital sites devoted to creating an ‘invisible college’ among the 
digerati (The Edge); and hybrid forms like TED Talks and airport bestsellers. As has 
been widely noted, professional expertise gives way to crowd-sourced, socially 
networked production and distribution of ideas. The logic of the system shifts from 
the authority of the author to the spreadability of the idea and its uptake among users 
(Jenkins et al., 2013).  
 
Attention becomes its own measure: you’re a thought leader if sufficient participants 
‘follow’, ‘like’ or ‘comment’ on your ideas; if not, not. Thought that is sufficiently 
liked might end up in a YouTube or FB ‘university’; ideas that are well distributed 
(Wikipedia) may trump disciplinary knowledge. Folksonomies outwit taxonomies; 
self-organising groups regulate knowledge practices online. Everyone can play (and 
so ‘outplay’ the paradigm), from celebrity Tweeters to anonymous originators of new 
‘memes’ that flash across the world from anywhere in the system. Innovation may be 
most intensive not in metropolitan centres like Paris but at the margins, in neglected 
or isolated regions along contested borders, among unfavoured populations, or in the 
clash of difference among groups.  
 
                                                        
12 For the 'lumpy universe’, see: http://imagine.gsfc.nasa.gov/science/questions/lumpy.html.  
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Such phenomena are widely noticed and have begun to be understood in descriptive 
detail, but much of the critical attention that is devoted to them is still organised 
around the public/private binary, including this special issue of MIA. A way out of 
that impasse, however, may be to hand. A group of researchers working in what we 
are calling ‘cultural science’ (Hartley & Potts 2104) is investigating new models of 
publishing, Open Access scholarly knowledge, and the sociocultural economics of the 
growth of knowledge. As well as Jason Potts (RMIT), they include Lucy Montgomery 
and myself at Curtin, Ellie Rennie at Swinburne, and Cameron Neylon, until recently 
of PLOS, among others. 
 
Instead of continuing with the distinction between public and private goods, we have 
begun to organise our approach around ‘club’ goods (Buchanan 1965) and ‘common 
goods’ (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom & Hess 2007). This is not the place for a detailed 
exposition of a nascent research program, but we think it points to a much more 
robust model of how innovations and ‘newness’ – new ideas – are produced, and how 
they are distributed and taken up in the overall process of knowledge-growth, which 
itself underlies economic growth and cultural improvement alike. We are developing 
the concepts of ‘knowledge clubs’ and ‘knowledge commons’, deriving them from 
our attempt to identify a cultural science based on naturalistic, evolutionary and 
complexity principles, to arrive at a new understanding of communication and culture. 
This is probably not quite the science that Barthes dreamed of, but that’s really the 
point: in the 1970s the evolutionary and complexity sciences were not where they are 
now, and the effort to link critical humanities with them was hampered by opposition 
to evolutionary theory (‘social Darwinism’).  
 
While the sciences have made amazing progress since the 1970s, in the humanities 
we’re still reading essays from Paris. If we are to understand how ideas are made, by 
what kinds of agency, and how they are distributed across whole populations to effect 
changes at system level, then we’re going to have to have another go at science. This 
is not just a matter of gaining the numeracy to be able to deal with the big data 
generated by the internet, social networks and digital media. More important is the 
problem of how to establish and trace causal sequence in such a complex and variable 
object of study as knowledge, and of how to constitute a field where new work adds 
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to what has been achieved in a systematic way, rather than vying for adherents based 
on ideological affiliation.  
 
How, in short, can we achieve ‘Neutral’ status for intellectual inquiry about public 
thought itself? Hartley and Potts (2014) attempt a first-approximation answer to that 
question by linking culture with the economics of discovery and innovation, seeking 
to understand the role that culture plays in the growth of knowledge. The conclusion 
we come to is that culture makes groups; groups make knowledge; and the way in 
which knowledge is constituted bears all the traces of that process across the span of 
human history. However, successive adoptions of new communications technologies 
– speech, writing, print, electronic and internet – have enabled quantum leaps in the 
growth of knowledge, generating successive economic epochs: hunter-gatherer, 
agricultural, industrial, information and creative.  
 
All along, groups are the key to both culture and knowledge. Cooperative and 
competitive groups of non-kin are our species’ unique survival mechanism (Pagel 
2012). They are constituted and bound together in language, culture, shared codes, 
know-how, technology and sociality – fictions, as Harari (2014) calls them, including 
religion, nation, the law, money, firms. They are differentiated from and hostile to 
competing groups, a stance that is signalled by incommensurable languages and 
knowledge systems, such that ‘our’ knowledge is trusted but ‘theirs’ isn’t. It follows 
that knowledge, meaningfulness and new ideas (innovation) are the products of 
groups, which also determine individuality and thus ‘personae’ (of the kind that 
David Marshall studies) within their bounds (culture). The fact that individuals these 
days have access to unprecedented numbers of groups – not only family, language-
community and ethno-territorial descent but also groups affiliated by taste, affinity 
and difference – means that identity itself is due for a rethink. This work is well under 
way of course: e.g. (among many) Tama Leaver’s project on ‘the ends of identity’;
13
 
Eleanor Sandry’s on robots and communication (2015); more widely, the work of Zizi 
Papacharissi, Nancy Baym, Alice Marwick, Kate Crawford and others (Hartley, 
Burgess & Bruns 2013).  
 
                                                        
13 See: www.tamaleaver.net/research/the-ends-of-identity/.  
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If the individual is not the source of action and choice but the product of systems and 
connections, this suggests that newness, innovation and the growth of knowledge 
need to be looked for in the actions and interactions of groups, not only in the 
motivations, talents and achievements of individuals. Naturally, talented, specialist, 
expert individuals are vital to the production of ‘newness’, but it’s the system that 
decides on value: you get the Nobel Prize because the group recognises the merit of 
your work, not for your merit as such (as many non-winners will attest!).  
 
Here is where the new concept of ‘knowledge clubs’ comes in; where knowledge is 
‘non-rivalrous’ but ‘excludable’. People form clubs for a purpose. Some clubs are 
organised for the purpose of growing knowledge and ideas. They retain the 
characteristics of culture: common language, adversarial competitiveness with 
external clubs, producing not just neutral or inert information but culture-made 
asymmetries of trust (with various tests and punishments to ensure group coherence), 
and reluctance to share ‘our’ knowledge with ‘them’. They are also apt to resort to a 
discursive version of the traditional solution to the problem of how to scale up and 
consolidate knowledge across multiple demes or groups – namely, conquest and the 
forcible assimilation of other groups’ demic knowledge. The same model can be 
observed in corporate take-overs; and even in the take-over of academic disciplines 
from the arts/humanities to the sciences – as has happened successively to economics, 
psychology, geography … but not, yet, to culture.  
 
But now global connectivity and the potential for species-wide social networks offers 
new possibilities for group-formation based on affinity as well as adversarial 
opposition. Here, we think a powerful explanatory concept is the other term from the 
economics of goods that has not yet been taken up, that of the knowledge commons 
(Ostrom; Ostrom & Hess), and more recently the idea of an ‘innovation commons’ 
(Potts 2012). We think that the drive towards Open Access and ‘public intellectuals’ 
alike needs to be augmented by urgent attention to how knowledge clubs and 
commons form and interact. With that will come a new perspective on the intellectual. 
Our guess is that such a figure will turn out to be a group, or rather a cluster of 
interacting groups, part human and part technological-media network. We don’t think 
it will be an oppositional figure. It might be entrepreneurial. It might play a regulatory 
role in system self-correction processes. ‘Public thought’ is in experimental 
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development in many different group-enterprises, from research groups and 
advocacy/activist groups to firms (large and small) and systems (small-world 
networks and planetary social networks).  
 
The task at hand is not to pine for the individualism of the intellectual, Parisian or 
public, nor to fall for opposition as the purpose of the knowledge agent, but to identify 
where and how new ideas are propagated, and what mechanisms are in place to 
encourage the development of a ‘club’ and ‘commons’ approach to knowledge, one 
that encourages the formation of new knowledge clubs while sharing knowledge 
gains. We need also to identify the ‘critical’ functions of self-organisation, self-
regulation and self-correction in groups, looking to system-automation (autopoiesis) 
for the organisational principle that Negri assigned to the command-and-control Party. 
Public intellectuals have not proven effective agents for these functions. Meanwhile 
the scientific, publicity and political ‘spheres’ have drifted further apart, mutually 
repelled by low-trust adversarial out-group hostility. Instead of reproducing such 
oppositions unwittingly, the intellectual function of large-scale social networks needs 
to get clubby. 
 
References 
Barthes, R. (1977a) Image-Music-Text. London: Fontana. 
Barthes, R. (1977b) ‘Lecture in inauguration of the Chair of Literary Semiology’. 
Paris: Collège de France, January 7. Trans. R. Howard. Accessible at: 
www.albany.edu/~rn774/fall96/barthes.html. [Published in French as Leçon. 
Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1978.] 
Barthes, R. (2005) The Neutral: Lecture Course at the Collège de France 1977-78. 
New York: Columbia University Press.  
Buchanan, J. (1965) ‘An Economic Theory of Clubs’. Economica NS, 32(125), 1-14. 
Gramsci, A. (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks. London: Lawrence and 
Wishart. 
Ford, H. (2013) ‘Two or Three Things I Know About Her’. Senses of Cinema, 66. 
Online: http://sensesofcinema.com/2013/cteq/two-or-three-things-i-know-about-
her/.  
Foucault, F. (1977) ‘The political function of the intellectual’, trans. C. Gordon. 
Radical Philosophy, 17, 12-14. Fr. original: (1976), ‘La fonction politique de 
 22 
l’intellectuel’. In D. Defert and F. Ewald (eds) (2001) Dits et écrits II, 1976-
1988, Paris: Gallimard, 109-114. 
Gitlin, T. (1987) The Sixties: Years Of Hope, Days Of Rage. New York: Bantam 
Books. 
Harari, Y.N. (2014) Sapiens: A brief history of humankind. London: Harvill Secker.  
Hartley, J. (2010) ‘Paradigm shifters: Tricksters and cultural science’. Cultural 
Science Journal 3(1), 1-19. Online: http://cultural-
science.org/journal/index.php/culturalscience/article/view/30/110.  
Hartley J. (2012) Digital Futures for Cultural and Media Studies. Malden MA & 
Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Hartley, J., J. Burgess and A. Bruns (eds) (2013) A Companion to New Media 
Dynamics. Malden MA and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Hartley, J. and J. Potts (2014) Cultural Science: A Natural History of Stories, Demes, 
Knowledge and Innovation. London: Bloomsbury. 
Jenkins, H., S. Ford and J. Green (2013) Spreadable Media: Creating Value and 
Meaning in a Networked Culture. New York: NYU Press. 
Lucy N. (2016) A Dictionary of Postmodernism. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Murphy, T. (2005) ‘Editor’s Introduction: Books for Burning’. In Negri (2005), ix-
xxviii. 
Negri, A. (2005) Books for Burning: Between Civil War and Democracy in 1970s 
Italy. Ed. T. Murphy. London: Verso. 
Ostrom, E. (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ostrom, E. and C. Hess (2007) ‘A framework for analyzing the knowledge 
commons’. In C. Hess and E. Ostrom (eds) Understanding Knowledge as 
Common. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 41-79.  
Pagel, M. (2012) Wired for Culture: The Natural History of Human Cooperation. 
London: Allen Lane. 
Potts, J. (2012) ‘Innovation in the Commons’. International Schumpeter Society: 
www.aomevents.com/media/files/ISS%202012/Potts.pdf. 
Sandry, E. (2015) Robots and Communication. UK: Palgrave Pivot. 
 
